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Abstract— Following the overall European political goals, 
massive efforts were recently made to promote an accelerated 
integration of renewable energy sources (RES) in Europe, 
creating several operational challenges. One of the key 
approaches to resolve these is to help harness RESs in an 
efficient and cost-effective way is to utilise flexibility which can 
be provided by Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) which 
include active demand participation, energy storage and electric 
vehicles. The present paper is based on results and learnings of 
H2020 project SmartNet (2016-2019), where five coordination 
schemes for TSO-DSO interaction, necessary for procurement 
and activation of ancillary services were developed and 
comparatively evaluated. The paper discusses how different 
coordination schemes all have specific benefits and attention 
points related to operation of the TSO and DSO grids, other 
market participants involved and the market operation in 
general. 
Index Terms— market architecture, transmission and 
distribution, European regulation 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Setting the 2020 climate and energy targets in 2007 was an 
important milestone, indicating a paradigm shift for the 
European power industry, which used to be one of the most 
conservative sectors. Massive efforts were made to promote 
an accelerated integration of renewable energy sources (RES) 
in Europe, however, the intermittent nature of these resources 
may require higher levels of ancillary services (AS). In 
addition, considerable share of RESs are connected at the 
distribution systems and which means that they change the 
nature of these networks that are becoming active, with 
possible changes in directions of power flows. One of the key 
approaches to help harness RESs in an efficient and cost-
effective way is to utilise flexibility which can be provided by 
Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) which include active 
demand participation, energy storage and electric vehicles. 
Some of the main aspects of the transition towards low-carbon 
energy systems envisioned by new European regulation and 
roadmaps [1] include market based provision of ancillary 
services by DERs that need to be give a level playing field to 
participate in all electricity/energy and ancillary services 
markets, at both transmission and distribution networks.  
DERs can be used as a valuable resource for frequency 
control, voltage regulation and congestion management, both 
at transmission and distribution levels. This will however 
require a significant modification of the present interaction 
between TSOs and DSOs and corresponding changes in the 
today's roles and responsibilities. In addition, operation of 
systems with high levels of DERs as well as design and 
operation of associated energy and ancillary services markets 
will need new tools and underpinning regulation and codes. 
The aim of this paper is to discuss some of the regulatory 
aspects that need to be considered and address  
The present paper is based on results and learnings of 
H2020 project SmartNet (2016-2019), where five coordination 
schemes for TSO-DSO interaction, necessary for procurement 
and activation of ancillary services were developed. These 
different schemes span from the situation of a complete 
centralized control over AS market to the creation of different 
local markets run by DSOs and one AS market run by the 
TSO. Comparative assessment of these schemes supports the 
initial idea and allows to compare these, based on results of 
cost-benefit analysis (CBAs). 
II. SMARTNET COORDINATION SCHEMES 
The project has developed five alternative architectures or 
coordination schemes (CSs) that each present a different way 
of organizing the coordination between transmission and 
distribution system operators (TSOs and DSOs), when 
distributed resources (production, storage or demand) are used 
for ancillary services (for details, see [2] and [3]). Each 
coordination scheme is characterized by a specific set of roles 
and responsibilities, taken up by system operators and a 
detailed market design. 
• Centralized AS market model (CS_A), where the 
TSO operates a market for both resources connected 
at transmission and distribution level, without 
involvement of the DSO. TSO contracts services 
directly from DER. No congestion management is 
carried out for distribution grids; 
• Local AS market model (CS_B), where the DSO 
organizes a local market for resources connected at 
the DSO-grid and, after solved local grid constraints, 
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offers the remaining to the AS market managed by 
TSO (procuring balancing and congestion 
management). 
• Shared balancing responsibility model (CS_C), 
where balancing responsibilities are divided between 
TSO and DSO according to a predefined schedule. 
The DSO organizes a local congestion and balancing 
market using local DER, while the TSO has no access 
to resources connected at the distribution grid. 
• Common TSO-DSO AS market model (CS_D), 
where the TSO and the DSO have a common 
objective to decrease costs to satisfy both the need for 
resources by the TSO and the DSO. This common 
objective could be realized by the joint operation of a 
common market (centralized variant) or the dynamic 
integration of a local market, operated by the DSO, 
and a central market, operated by the TSO 
(decentralized variant). 
• Integrated flexibility market model (CS_E), where 
the market is open for both regulated and non- 
regulated market parties, which requires the 
introduction of an independent market operator to 
guarantee neutrality. TSOs, DSOs and commercial 
market parties contract DER in a common flexibility 
market. 
Table I provides a short overview of different benefits and 
attention points for the suggested coordination schemes. 
In order to compare CS performance, SmartNet has 
developed a simulation platform, modelling in detail T&D 
networks, ancillary services markets and implementing a very 
detailed dataset of generators and loads. Simulations are 
carried out on midterm scenarios (time horizon 2030) for 
Spain, Denmark and Italy to identify the best TSO-DSO 
coordination scheme for each country.  
The same platform is also implemented in a laboratory in 
order to test real network equipment on the developed 
simulation scenarios (hardware-in-the-loop).  The simulation 
results were further assessed by using a set of specific key 
performance indicators (KPIs). The overall method and 
outcomes of the evaluation are presented in detail in [5].
TABLE I SUMMARY OF THE BENEFITS AND ATTENTION POINTS FOR SMARTNET COORDINATION SCHEMES. SOURCE [4] 
Coordination 
Scheme 
Benefits Attention points 
Centralized AS  
market model  
Efficient scheme in case when TSO is the only buyer 
for the service. Having only one market is low in 
operational costs and supports standardized processes. 
The most in line with current regulatory framework 
No real involvement of DSO.DSO grid constraints not always respected 
Local AS market 
model  
DSO has priority in using local flexibility. DSO actively 
supports AS procurement. 
TSO and DSO markets for services are cleared sequentially. Local markets 
might be rather illiquid. Need for extensive communication between TSO 
market and local DSO markets. 
Shared balancing 
responsibility model 
The TSO will need to procure a lower amount of AS. 
Local markets might create lower entry barriers for 
small scaled DERs. 
Total amount of AS to be procured by TSO and DSO maybe higher in this 
scheme. BRPs might face higher costs for balancing.  Small local markets 
may not be liquid enough to provide sufficient resources for the DSO 
Common TSO-DSO  
AS market model 
Total cost of AS for TSO and DSO are minimized. TSO 
and DSO make optimal use of each other. 
Individual cost of TSO and DSO might be higher compared to other 
schemes. Allocation of costs between TSO and DSO could be difficult. 
Integrated flexibility 
market model 
Increased possibilities for BRPs to solve imbalances in 
their portfolio. High liquidity and relative low prices 
due to large number of buyers and sellers. 
Independent market operator needed to operate the grid. Negative impact 
on the development and liquidity of intraday markets. TSO and DSO need 
to share data with Independent Market Operator (IMO). 
 
  
III. EVALUATION OF THE SMARTNET COORDINATION 
SCHEMES (CSS) 
In order to identify compliance of the proposed 
coordination schemes with the current regulation and overall 
position of the main stakeholders it has been identified 25 
main issues, here referred to as topics of interest, which are 
associated with solutions and assumptions, which are essential 
for the min outcomes of the project. These topics have been 
evaluated in a comprehensive screening study, based on more 
than 40 different documents such as position papers, 
strategies, roadmaps and legislation/regulation (EU Directives, 
Network guidelines, national regulatory Decisions) (see [4] for 
the complete overview). The following lines present the 
assessment of the coordination schemes that has been 
considered by the SmartNet project.  
First, the Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) results [6], based 
on the numerical simulations performed on the three national 
2030 scenarios (Italy, Denmark and Spain), are briefly 
introduced. Then a list of remarks mainly but not only related 
to regulation is showed [7]. 
From the analysis of the proposed TSO-DSO coordination 
schemes, it is evident how the amount of services requested 
by the DSO (i.e. congestion management) is making the 
difference in terms of cost effectiveness. In fact, looking at 
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the Italian case (Figure 1.a) where a consistent amount of 
congestions is expected to occur at distribution level [8], 
market architectures including distribution network 
constraints are more optimal than the ones featured by 
coordination schemes in which the DSO cannot buy 
flexibility (CS_A). This is particularly noticeable by looking 
at the amount of activated aFRR, indicating the residual 
imbalance after the market clearing (resulting from 
forecasting error and unforeseen congestions).  
 
Figure 1. Results of the CBA analysis of the three National 2030 Scenario 
simulated 
 
The simulated 2030 scenario for Denmark, instead, is 
returning opposite results (Figure 1.b). The negligible amount 
of congestions at distribution level, as well as the low amount 
of reserve needed for the balancing services, is making the 
cost of ICT decisive in determining the most beneficial 
coordination scheme. The middle ground is obtained for the 
Spanish scenario (Figure 1.c), where the cost of ICT equals 
the benefits achieved thanks to the inclusion of distribution 
constraints in market clearing algorithms. 
All the considered scenarios are affected by scarcity and 
illiquidity of resources at distribution level specifically for the 
provision of local balancing services (this scarcity also affect 
CS_B which has slightly lower performance than CS_D). 
This assumption is making the application of CS_C quite 
inefficient, having the market clearing algorithms often 
unable to satisfy the balancing requirements and resulting in 
high operation (mFRR+aFRR) costs. More details on the 
simulation environment and the cost figures, including the 
one assigned to information and communication technology 
(ICT), are detailed in [5], [6], [9], [10]. 
A. Centralized AS market model (CS_A) 
CS_A defines that DSOs involvement is limited to 
prequalification of resources at distribution level to guarantee 
that no congestions are generated by the activation of such 
resources. Thus, the DSOs must have a full control over their 
network, and for this purpose appropriate investments in ICT 
are needed. So, DSOs should be made able to compare such 
investments in ICT with the ones on the Distribution Network 
(DN) expansion, within a long-term planning perspective and 
in coordination with Transmission, since the look has to be 
broadened on the efficiency of the whole system. Regulation 
should thus consider this need, for example by passing from 
the present CAPEX approach to the TOTEX one. 
B. Local AS market model (CS_B) 
CS_B defines that a local congestion market is run for the 
DN. After DSOs activate the needed resources to solve local 
congestions, the remaining ones are made available to TSOs 
for the global balancing market, that takes place in a second 
step. 
This two-step procedure may likely reduce the economic 
efficiency of the system. For instance, when the knowledge of 
the whole System status is available (e.g. as like as what 
happens in CS_D, discussed above), the imbalance caused by 
the solution of a local congestion could help to solve a 
possible opposite imbalance, reducing the amount of 
resources activated. If the local market is run before the 
global balancing one, not only the above operation is 
impossible, but, also, the local. System is rebalanced after 
congestion is solved, and in the second step furthermore 
activations are needed to solve the global imbalance. 
Furthermore, since local networks may be very small and 
with a very limited amount of resources available, the risk of 
lack of liquidity and/or exercise of market power increases. 
Obviously, these risks are related to all the possible 
market schemes (not only the four schemes assessed within 
the SmartNet project), but they increase if the perimeter of 
the market is reduced. Thus, the solution is to enlarge as 
much as possible the perimeter of the market by allowing the 
small DSOs to join up in a single, and wider, local market; by 
increasing the amount of resources participating to the local 
market, for example introducing market products tailored on 
their technical needs, particularly on the demand side. 
Local and global markets may also have different timing. 
In this case, they have to be properly coordinated in order to 
avoid double acceptance of bids presented on both markets 
(e.g. a common database of resources shared between TSO 
and DSOs without time correlation so that once a resource 
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has been selected by one operator it becomes unavailable for 
the others, as in the “Common Sequenced Market” in [5]). 
C. Shared balancing responsibility model (CS_C) 
CS_C is set up with two separated markets for 
Transmission and Distribution, with a fixed exchange profile 
imposed at the boundary between the two; DSOs are given 
also balancing responsibilities on local networks, on which, 
then, they must have a complete control: further investments 
in ICT are fundamental. 
The firm constraint imagined in SmartNet at the boundary 
between T&D is very strong and may result in a large loss of 
optimality (if not even prevent to find a solution, with the 
need to activate Unwanted Measures). To add some degrees 
of flexibility at this boundary could be beneficial to the 
efficiency of such a scheme, but it is difficult to figure out 
how to maintain the complete separation between the two 
market. However, this complete separation may also have 
some good effects, as, for example, to prevent high (local) 
prices to spread along the whole System. On the other hand, 
these high prices may be consequence of the separation, that 
likely prevents the activation of the more efficient resources 
if they are “on the wrong side”; furthermore, also 
compensation of local and global imbalances with different 
signs is always impeded. 
Again, liquidity and/or market power exercise risk may 
likely be significant here, also because they are related not 
only to congestion management but also for balancing. For all 
these reasons, CS_C is expected to perform poorly by an 
economic point of view; this is confirmed by simulations, as 
shown in Figure 1. Since this is the only scheme that 
implement a local balancing market, we can ascribe a share of 
that inefficiency also to this peculiarity, so that we can infer 
that balancing should be coped with globally (as diffusely 
acknowledged – see for instance [11]). 
D. Common TSO-DSO AS market model (CS_D) 
Finally, CS_D is characterized by a common AS Market 
for both DSOs and TSOs. This market includes all technical 
and network constraints, so that a consistent computational 
effort for its clearing is needed; on the other hand, since all 
the information is shared and available, the very optimal 
solution can be found and we can expect high economic 
performances, as confirmed by our simulations (Figure 1). 
Obviously, this purpose needs a strong TSO-DSO 
cooperation; in particular, regulation should take care of all 
the data sharing implications. 
A relevant drawback of such a scheme (it affects all the 
schemes, but this one in particular since no other significant 
drawbacks are present) is the impact of forecasting error: it 
may drive to activate resources for solving forecasted 
imbalances and/or congestions that in real time do not occur, 
so that counteractions are needed in real time (as it happened 
in some simulations). Pushing gate closure as close as 
possible to real time and/or increasing market clearing 
frequency could help in reduce this impact; however, some 
technical constraints may not be easily eliminated: as already 
said, the computational effort to clear the common market 
with all the network constraints included. 
In any case, the experience of the three Pilot projects in 
SmartNet (in particular of the Spanish Pilot) showed clearly 
that the use of flexibility resources gives to DSOs more 
options, than the simple network reconfiguration, to solve 
local network issues, leading to an evident increase in the 
economic and technical efficiency of the local network 
operation. 
E. Integrated flexibility market model (CS_E) 
CS_E considers the case of a common market in which 
both regulated (TSO and DSO) and Commercial Market 
Parties (CMPs) procure flexibilities. It may reveal promising 
to eliminate different markets gate closure overlapping, since 
it could be considered a “mix” of Intraday and AS Markets, 
and effective for certain kind of AS (for instance, for solving 
balancing issues). However, it may have some significant 
drawbacks, as: 
• since CMPs can change their output in this market, 
uncertainty may arise both about the real amount of 
congestion and imbalance in the System and, then, 
about how many resources are needed by TSOs and 
DSOs; 
• since TSOs and DSOs compete in equal terms with 
other CMPs for flexibility, in some scenarios they 
could no longer be sure even to acquire the resources 
they need; 
• the high level of competition could result in very 
high market prices. 
Due to the need to consider game theory elements, this 
scheme is characterized by a high level of mathematical 
complexity, so, within the SmartNet Project, it was neither 
investigated as deeply as the other ones nor simulated. Thus, 
it remains field for further investigations 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
The different coordination schemes all have specific 
benefits and attention points related to operation of the TSO 
and DSO grids, other market participants involved and the 
market operation in general. The choice of the appropriate 
coordination scheme is dependent on multiple factors such as 
the type of ancillary service, normal operation versus 
emergency situations, the state of the grid, the amount of RES 
installed, the current market design and the regulatory 
framework. Moreover, the choice for a specific coordination 
scheme does not imply that this scheme could never be 
adapted.  
Across coordination schemes, there is a gradual increase 
of the role and responsibilities of the DSO. Dependent on the 
national evolution, a country can evolve from one 
coordination scheme to another. In particular, the Centralized 
AS market model (CS_A), the Common TSO-DSO AS 
market model (CS_D) (centralized variant) and the Integrated 
flexibility (CS_E) market model share a common market 
architecture in terms of market platform and ICT 
requirements. A shift between these coordination schemes is 
mainly a question of a change in roles and responsibilities. 
The Shared balancing responsibility model could be seen as a 
duplication of the same market architecture as well.  Also, the 
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Local AS market model and the Common TSO-DSO AS 
market model (decentralized variant) share a common market 
architecture. 
The feasibility of the implementation of each coordination 
scheme is very dependent upon the regulatory framework. 
The Centralized AS market model is the most in line with 
current regulations. The other coordination schemes would 
require considerable changes with respect to roles and 
responsibilities of TSOs and DSOs.  
The implementation of a coordination scheme is also 
influenced by the national organization of TSOs and DSOs, 
e.g.  the number of system operators (both TSOs and DSOs) 
and the way they currently interact.  
In addition, the implementation of certain coordination 
schemes will have an impact on other markets, such as the 
Intraday markets. Dependent on the services offered in the 
AS market, and compared to the Intraday markets (IDM), 
these markets might be able to co-exist or alternatively, may 
need to be integrated. Although TSO-DSO coordination 
could be organized on a country level, it is important to 
integrate national TSO-DSO coordination set-ups within the 
process of EU harmonization and integration. 
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